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Göran Therborn 
THE WORKING CLASS AND THE WELFARE STATE  
A Historical-Analytical Overview and 
A Little Swedish Monograph 
 
1. The Working Class Perspective 
 
The histories of the welfare state have hitherto, on the whole, been written from above. 
Their searching eye has been firmly fixed on governments and Civil servants, and mainly 
with a view to looking into what the latter have contributed to the development of what 
from today's perspective appears to be the main feature of the welfare state, social 
insurance and large-scale income maintenance programmes. The best of these works 
embody an impressive scholarship, combining meticulous with imagination and subtlety.1 
But their approach tends to preclude from the outset a full understanding of the emergent 
reality of the welfare state. After all, the latter arose as form of dealing with what was 
once called "the working and dangerous classes". Therefore, an understanding of the rise 
of the welfare state seems to require an understanding also of what the working class and 
its organizations and mouthpieces thought, demanded, and fought for with regard to 
welfare and State, and of what happened to all that.2 
 
When a class perspective is brought to bear on the welfare state, this is usually done by 
social scientists, who have to substitute theoretical dissection, economic analysis or 
correlational causation for historical investigation.3 
 
So, let us then begin by asking what the workers and the workers' movement themselves 
thought and did “workers question" and "workers' insurance". Short of historical research, we 
will largely have to confine ourselves to what the organized movement said, but as far as 
possible within the boundaries of a little essay, an attempt will be made to relate movement 
expressions to class experiences. Since class is a category not bound by state borders, we 
will make a brief overview of the centres of the European labour movement in order to 
catch a glimpse of what may be called a working class perspective in social policy and of 
the welfare state. 
 
1.1. Collective Autonomy, Work and Politics 
 
What is most immediately striking from a look at labour history in relation to the 
conventional welfare state perspectives of the 1980s is the middle class perspective of the 
trajectory from poor-relief to the welfare state. The working class and the labour movement 
had different concerns. 
 
Social security, to the extent it existed and/or was envisaged, was not an aspect of the state, 
but of autonomous class or popular institutions, friendly societies and trade unions in 
Britain, mutual aid societies and compagnonnages in France. "Combination" was a key 
word in early British working class parlance and practice, "association" that of the French 
working class from the 1830s. Herein were combined trade union struggle, mutual aid in 
case of need, and a socialist or cooperative reorganization of society. The weekly Trades 
Newspaper, founded in 1825 by the London "trades"/unions, had as its motto "They helped 
everyone his neighbour".4 The British friendly societies had about a million members by 
1815, the trade unions - many of which also functioned as friendly societies - the same 
number in 1834.5 In France 2438 mutual aid societies with about 250.000 members were 
identified in 1852.6 These, legally recognized, collective bodies provided sick pay, health 
care, widows' pensions, funeral costs, etc. for their members and their families. The 
resources and the benefits of these societies were meagre and fragile, and their range of 
coverage limited, but they provide an important background to the positions taken by the 
labour movement with regard to social regulations by the state. Another reason why 
collective autonomy was an important part of a working class perspective on social 
security was the early importance of employer-provided or employer-controlled welfare 
benefits. A French researcher has called these employer provisions of the 19th century "the 
first drafts of our Social Security"7, and they were put up by vigilantly anti-union 
employers, such as Krupp and the British railway companies8, as well as by more 
progressive ones. This second kind of non-state welfare institution (of a non-charitable 
kind) could be quite extensive. Thus, in Prussia in 1876, 59% of 4850 "larger industrial 
enterprises" had an accident insurance, 42% ran a health insurance, 14 % provided health 
care or housing.9 
 
The struggle for workers' management or co-management of enterprise institutions of social 
provision began very early. Among the French miners it dates back to 1850: A protracted 
struggle ensued, spearheaded by the miners and the railwaymen. Both groups of workers 
demanded and finally got state protection of their autonomy from the employers.10 A 
similar struggle by German miners in the 1860's was the one single case of social policy, in 
today's sense of the word, which was dealt with by the First International.11 
 
What the early working class movement positively demanded from the state was work and 
the regulation of working conditions and working time. Since the Napoleonic Wars English 
cotton spinners had their Short-time Committees agitating for working time regulation, and 
by 1847 a pace-setting Ten Hours bill for women and children in the textile industry was 
passed.12 Under heavy pressure from working class associations, the Provisional 
Government coming out of the French February Revolution was forced to "commit... itself 
to guarantee the existence of the worker by labour... to guarantee labour to all citizens." To 
the workers, guaranteed work and free workers' associations were the main content of the 
revolution, and the government's closing of the National Workshops brought the Parisian 
proletariat and populace into rebellion and, finally, bloody defeat.13 
 
A third aspect of the early working class perspective should also be emphasized from the 
outset. That is the predominance of political concerns over social ones, of political rights 
and the abolition of political privilege, the right to associate, the right to vote, over and 
above social rights. This is clear from the programmes of the labour international and 
parties, but it might be argued that such a properly political perspective was a contribution 
of socialist intellectuals from outside the working class. The historical record, however, 
shows an opposite relationship between political and social reform. The first nationwide 
working class mass movement in history, Chartism, was a movement exclusively 
demanding (male) parliamentary democracy.14 True, it was preceded by a dispersed trade 
unionism, and trade unions are no doubt the most universal working class institution. 
 
"But Chartism was different from earlier reform movements, and from protests like the 
poor law and factory movements. Whereas they were all campaigns in which workers 
participated alongside other classes and under middle class or aristocrat leadership, 
Chartism was consciously and overwhelmingly a working-class campaign."15  Of course, 
political and socio-economic issues and concerns were interwoven. The radical Chartist and 
anti-poor law campaigner J.R. Stephens put it thus in a speech in 1838: "... by universal 
suffrage I mean to say that every working man in the land has a right to a good coat on his 
back, a good hat on his head, a good roof for the shelter of his household, a good dinner 
upon his table."16 Similarly, the Walloon workers, who between 1891 and 1912 went on a 
series of militant and violently repressed strikes for universal and equal suffrage, also 
fought for what they saw as the likely consequences or implications of the latter, a reduced 
working day, more job safety, pensions, etc. But the point is: "The politics in which the 
proletarians of Wallonia became interested - and how fast! - is nothing else than the fight 
for universal suffrage."17 
 
A perspective on welfare state development which has an awareness of class and class 
conflict cannot stick to the bureau vistas of the state policy maker or the vision of the 
concerned middle class reformer and follow a post hoc constructed line evolution from 
poor relief to institutions of income maintenance. It will have to open itself to the class 
Society itself, to the collective strivings in the latter, to its struggles for power and 
autonomy, and to concerns other than those of the latterday social worker. 
 
1.2. Social Policy in the Programmes of the International Labour Movement 
The ten immediate post-revolutionary demands - after the conquest of democracy - of the 
programme of the Communist League, i.e., the Communist Manifesto include nothing 
about social security. They do include demands for strongly progressive taxation and for 
public and free education together with the abolition of child factory labour in its current 
form. 
 
In his inaugural address to the First International, Marx hailed the British Ten Hours Act as 
a victory of "the political economy of the working class", and pointed, secondly, to the 
important example of the cooperative movement, for having shown that large-scale modern 
production is possible without a class master. No other social issue was raised, nor in the 
preamble the statutes of the International.18 The most important concrete immediate 
demand put forward by the First International was the legal limitation of the working day. 
Its 1866 Congress in Geneva declared: "A preliminary condition, without which all further 
attempts at improvement and emancipation must prove abortive, is the legal limitation of 
the working day". Referring to demands raised by American workers, the Congress 
proposed an eight-hour day.19 The Congress adopted a curious resolution on child labour. It 
demanded the restriction of the working hours of children aged 9 to 12 to two hours, and 
that juvenile labour should always be combined with education. But it also held forth that 
"in a rational state of society every child whatever, from the age of nine years, ought to 
become a protective labourer..."20 
The two competing founding congresses of the Second International in Paris in 1889, the 
Marxist and the Possibilist, both put the eight-hour day first on the agenda. The Marxist one 
added a catalogue of demands for protective work legislation, from the interdiction of the 
work of children under 14 to that of "certain branches of industry and certain modes of 
manufacturing prejudicial to the health of the workers". The Congress also decided to 
follow the American Federation of Labor in calling for an international 8-hours 
demonstration on the first of May 1890, and an executive commission was charged with the 
task of transmitting to the international government congress on work legislation proposed 
by Switzerland the demands of the Paris Congress.21 The Parisian decisions were 
reaffirmed at the Second Congress in 1891, in a resolution vehemently denouncing the 
hostility of existing governments with respect to workers' protection. The stronger language 
of the resolution, put forward by the Belgian Vandervelde, was a concession to the SPD 
leader Bebel, who, supported by his Austrian colleague Adler, emphasized that the main 
task of Social Democracy was not to wring a piece of protective legislation, but to educate 
the workers about the character of the present Society with a view to letting it disappear as 
soon as possible. Bebel also underlined that the SPD had been against the protective 
legislation put forward by the German government.22 
 
The Erfurt Programme of the SPD, adopted in 1891, was a sort of model programme of the 
Second International. For example, it provided the blueprint for the 1897 Swedish SAP 
programme. The programme ends with a list of specific, immediate demands. First there is 
a set of ten points, starting with the franchise and the electoral system, ending with 
education, jurisdiction, and health progressive income and wealth tax. Then follows a 
Special list of demands "for the protection of the working class": five work regulations, 
beginning with the 8-hour day, a demand for supervision and inspection of work conditions 
through special public bodies, equality of agricultural and domestic workers with 
industria!_ workers, security of the right of association, and, finally, "Takeover of the 
whole Workers' insurance by the State with decisive /massgebender/ cooperation of the 
workers in the administration."23 
 
The Congresses of the Second International, after the first ones, devoted little time to 
discussions of social policy and worker protection. However, the Amsterdam Congress of 
1904 passed a resolution introduced by SPD, on "Working-Class Insurance". This is the 
first time in the history of the international labour movement that social insurance is 
accorded a central position among immediate demands. Protection of the forces of labour, 
the resolution says, "cannot be better reached in a capitalist society than by laws 
establishing an effective system of insurance for the workers." Insurance should cover "the 
period when it is impossible for them to avail themselves of their labour-power in 
consequence of illness, accident, incapacity, old age, pregnancy, maternity or glut /of the 
labour market?GTh/. The workers ought to demand that their insurance establishments 
should be under the administration of the insured themselves, and that the same condition 
should be given to the workers of the country and to the strangers of all nations.."24 The 
Stuttgart Congress of 1907 dealt with workers' migration, but had no further topic of Social 
policy on its agenda. 
 
The Eighth Congress in Copenhagen in 1910 adopted a resolution on "workers' legislation", 
repeating the demands of the Paris and Amsterdam Congress, especially singling out the 
non-protected condition of workers in agriculture and forestry. A novelty was a resolution 
on unemployment. There were demands, first of all, for "general obligatory insurance, the 
administration of which should be left to the workers' organizations and the costs of which 
should be borne by the holders of the means of protection." Further, public works, where 
unemployed are paid at the union rate, the creation and the subsidy of trade union or 
bipartite labour exchanges, a reduction of the hours of work, and, pending general 
insurance, financial subsidies of unemployment funds. "There subsidies have to leave the 
trade union organizations in full autonomy.”25  
 
In their reports to the Copenhagen Congress, some of the affiliated parties, notably the 
German, the Danish, and the Swedish, gave rather extensive presentations of activities in 
the field of social policy, by themselves as well as by their respective governments. The 
SPD proposal with regard to social insurance, and most immediately health insurance, was 
for "a uniform organization under the self-government of the insured... including all these 
working for wages or salary, also all other persons with an income of not more than 5000 
marks per year... and free medical attendance."26 
 
Between the world wars, the main social policy preoccupations of the Socialist 
International were the (largely unsuccessful) fight for the governmental ratification of the 
Washington Convention on the 8-hour day and the question of unemployment, even before 
the onset of the Depression.27 The abortive attempt, in Berlin in 1922, to unite the II, the 2 
1/2, and the III International did produce a declaration of common action on two questions, 
for the 8-hour day and against unemployment.28 Regulation of the working time and 
securing the 8-hour day was foremost also in the international of Social Democratic trade 
unions. At its Fifth Congress in Stockholm in 1930, its Belgian Vice-President Mertens 
presented a social policy programme. It contained a list of social insurances and a set of 
worker protection measures, with specified demands for union control or cooperation.29 It 
was adopted by the ensuing Congress in Brussels, in the through of the Depression and with 
little effects. 
 
As could be expected, the Comintern devoted little attention to questions of social policy. 
In the resolutions of its first four congresses the latter are only touched upon once, and 
then rather obliquely. The Agrarian Programme of the Fourth Congress includes a 
paragraph about the fight for an eight-hour day and for social insurance for agricultural 
workers.30 This scant interest for ameliorations of the workers' lot within capitalism 
follows naturally from the early Comintern's perspective of immediate revolution. 
More significant, perhaps, is the 1928 programme of the Comintern. Here, among the 
"main tasks of the proletarian dictatorship", is a point D about Worker Protection. It 
includes a shortened work week: the interdiction of nightwork and work in dangerous 
branches of industry by women; social insurance paid for by the state and self-managed 
by the insured; free, extended health care; societal care of children together with the 
recognition of motherhood as a social contribution, and social equality of men and 
women. Point E contains a programme of housing expropriation and construction.31 
 
We will end this survey with the programme indicating the dissolution of a specific 
working class perspective. This dissolution is manifested in the 1951 Frankfurt Declaration 
of Social Democracy. There, the concepts of class struggle, working class, and classes have 
disappeared - replaced by man, citizens, people. The social policy part is expressed in terms 
of human rights: "3. Socialism stands not only for basic political rights but also for 
economic and social rights. Among these are: The right to work; The right to medical and 
maternity benefits; The right to leisure; The right to economic security for citizens unable 
to work because of old age, incapacity or unemployment; The right of children to welfare, 
and of the youth to education in accordance with their abilities; The right to adequate 
housing".32 
 
1.3. The Social Policy Perspective of the Working Class 
 
Guided by an analytical class perspective, controlled by an empirical overview of the 
practical and programmatic efforts of organized labour, we should be able to piece together 
a theoretical construct of a working class type of social policy as a tool for disentangling 
different contributions to the contemporary welfare state, and for gauging working class 
success or failure in different countries and different periods. 
 
A. The Guiding Principle 
 
Most immediately and most directly, what workers rose and organized to fight for were 
workers' rights to livelihood, to a decent human life. A conception of workers' rights 
seems to be the guiding principle running through working class perspectives on social 
policy, a principle opposed to insurance as well as to charity, an assertion overriding 
liberal arguments about the requirements of capital accumulation, dangers of 
competitiveness, and the necessity of incentives. The labour perspective is first of all an 
assertion of the rights of working persons, against the logics of charity objects, market 
commodities or of thrifty savers. It would be a bigot Marxism which denied that this 
working class principle may at times overlap with the compassion of humanitarian 
middle class reformers, an aristocratic paternalist sense of obligation, a Radical 
conception of citizens' rights or the enlightened self-interest of businessmen and 
statesmen, concerned with the reproduction of the labour force, of the soldier force, or of 
the existing social order. But there are also occasions and issues on which the working 
class tends to be left alone with its principle, in which other concerns take on an 
overriding importance to other groups and classes. Unemployment and the treatment of 
the unemployed is such a crucial issue. Shall the unemployed have the same rights and 
conditions as the workers, whom it is profitable to employ, in public works employment 
or as benefit receivers? Should the prevention of unemployment be a task of social 
policy overriding all others? Questions like these form touchstones of class perspectives. 
 
B. Task Priorities 
 
The first working class priority is undoubtedly protection of the class itself, Arbeiterschutz 
(worker Protection), as it is tellingly termed in German: leisure from work, safety at work, 
and union rights. 
 
The labour movement has always been male dominated and, in spite of the explicit 
demands for the legal equality of women, this workers' protection orientation often includes 
a patriarchal Special protectionist attitude towards women and women's work, often 
assimilated with that of children.33 Class also has a gender aspect. The second priority of 
the labour movement has been the right to work, the maintenance of employment under 
non-punitive conditions. Income maintenance and social insurance arranged by the state is 
not an original working class demand. Insurance by means of associations of mutual aid 
developed early in working class history, but State insurance comes from elsewhere. For 
instance, it does not figure in the Social Democratic Gotha Programme of 1875, in spite of 
the latter's half-Lassallean pro-state perspective.34 The founding congress of the Austrian 
Social Democratic Workers' Party in December-January 1888-89 dismissed the workers' 
Insurance organized by the state - just adopted in Germany and Austria. Both because of 
the lack of significane to the social problems of the "worker who is capable of working" 
and because of its directly negative effects in "the partial transfer of the costs of poor relief 
from the municipalities to the working class and the restriction as much as possible, where 
feasible the shoving aside of the independent support organisations of the workers". Instead 
the Congress demanded a "worker protection legislation (Arbeiterschutz Gesetzgebung)".35 
 
This does not mean, however, that the labour movement and the perceived threat from it 
did not play a significant part in the establishment of public social insurance. We have the 
word of Bismarck: "If Social Democracy did not exist, and if there were not masses of 
people intimidated by it, then the moderate advances which we have managed to push 
through in the area of social reform would not yet exist..."36 
 
When the labour movement comes to demand extension of social insurance this is always 
seen in relation to incapacity to work, not in terms of breadwinner responsibilities and 
family size. Universal public education is an early demand, whereas public housing and 
housing hygiene appear somewhat later. Housing does not appear in the Erfurt Programme, 
for instance. It is brought to the Sixth Congress of the International in Amsterdam in 1904 
by the British delegation. 
 
C. Administrative Control 
Who should administer social insurance and welfare benefit schemes has been a central 
theme in the class conflicts around social policy and social institutions. From the French 
and German miners in the 1850's and 60 's through the II International to the 1928 
Comintern programme for the time after the revolution, autonomous self-management has 
been a persistent demand of the workers' movement, with bipartite or tripartite forms as 
second and third best. There have been several reasons for this concern: For instance to 
establish and guarantee entitlement to benefits independent of the employer's discretion 
and punishment; to ensure a humane non-bureaucratic consideration of claims and 
claimants; to prevent the use of the funds involved by the employers or by the State; to 
train administrative cadres of the working class organization; to boost the recruitment of 
members. 
 
D. Coverage and Organizational Form 
 
A wide coverage and a uniform organization of social regulations and social institutions 
have been part of the strivings of labour from very early on. A regional organization 
encompassing all the mining companies was fought for by the French and the Saxon miners 
mentioned above. Later this was extended to demands for international or internationally 
congruent regulations of work and leisure and to uniform organization of national 
insurance. Coverage should be wide, all wage workers and salary employers, with 
particular attention paid to bring in agricultural, domestic, and foreign workers into the 
schemes. Somewhat later, but at least already in the first decade of this century - as we have 
seen above in the case of SPD - demands were raised for including low-income earners in 
general. 
 
These are demands, which ought to be expected from a rational working class point of 
view, as maximizing autonomy from particular employers and the unity of the class and its 
potential allies. General schemes, covering the whole population, however, can be only at 
most a second best strategy, erosive of class unity and difficult to combine with working 
class forms of administration. And demands for such schemes seem not to be found in the 
early and the classical periods of the labour movement, up to the Depression and the Social 
Democratic breakthroughs in Scandinavia and in New Zealand. As an international 
conception, schemes of income maintenance seem to be an effect of the national anti-
Fascist war efforts, the context of the unexpectedly enthusiastic reception of the Beveridge 
report of 1942.37 Demands for administrative control and aims for organizational 
recruitment may make working class organizations sometimes opt for less than full 
coverage. This holds particularly for the case when specific class organizations so far have 
been the only one in providing certain benefits. It would then be in the interest of the labour 
movement to restrict a public insurance for such benefits to those who are or will become 
members. The field where this has occurred in Europe has mainly been in unemployment 
insurance.38 
 
E. Finance 
 
The very origin of the labour movement was a protest against, among other things, the 
existing distribution of income and life chances. When issues of public insurance and 
public social services were raised, the labour movement always insisted on a redistributive 
mode of finance, either by progressive taxation (or luxury taxation) or by employers' 
contributions. This redistributive principle is, of course, different from, in conflict with the 
insurance principle, though between the two different compromises may be struck. 
 
Another kind of compromise may come out of the possible conflict between a redistributive 
non-contributory finance and a say in the administration. The latter may be difficult or 
impossible to get without financial contribution. Before World War I the French CGT, and 
the Guesdist wing of the Socialist party, waged a vehement resistance against workers' 
contributions to a public pensions insurance - and to the bill as a whole - which became law 
in 1910. The law was a failure, the CGT had expressed the sentiments of the French 
workers on this issue. (The critique also referred to the capitalization scheme and the high 
age of retirement). After the war, however, the CGT became a champion of Social 
insurance with principled acceptance of workers' contributions as the legitimate basis for 
trade union control of the administration. (And the belated health and old age insurance act 
of 1930 was also in practice accepted and supported by the workers).39 
 
Part of the redistributive perspective is also an early demand for public services free of 
charge, of education, health care, later also a wide range of municipal services (not 
necessarily free of users' tariffs).40 
 
2. Social Policy and the Agenda of the Swedish Labour Movement 
 
 A year after the end of World War II, i.e., at what was then regarded as Social Democratic 
"harvest time", the Swedish General and Factory Workers' Union held a national conference 
Social policy and wage policy. The secretary of the union, Gunnar Mohlne, said in the 
debate: "It is probably quite right to say that the unionized workers are not as interested in the 
questions of Social policy as in those of wage policy." Other speakers agreed.41 A perusal of 
the minutes of Social Democratic party congresses also indicates that till 1940 other 
questions clearly held a larger interest than those of social policy in the widest possible sense 
of the word: defence and disarmament was the major issue, and other of great concern we 
land reform and organizations matters. 
 
Social policy had no natural top position on the agenda of Social Democracy, including the 
lists of electoral promises. Only from the mid-1920s did Social issues begin to rank very 
prominently on the latter. On the other hand, from very early on, the Social policy-making 
that there was in the SAP was in very distinguished hands. Till World War I, at least, the 
party's leading Social politician was "the Chieftain" himself, party leader Branting. In the 
second generation, one member of the compact and stable gruppo dirigente of the party, 
Gustav Möller, devoted the major part of his long and important career to Social policy. 
 
The rise of the Swedish welfare state is a complex and multifaceted story. In this section we 
will try to begin disentangling it by looking at the story, also complex, of social policy in 
the history of the Swedish labour movement. Only a few broad strokes of the picture can be 
painted here. The paint comes mainly from congress minutes of the SAP (the Social 
Democratic Party) and of the LO (TUC), the minutes of the Part Executive till about 1950, 
the party theoretical journal Tiden, and electoral materials. Other sources have been 
searched out more selectively. 
 
2.1. From Worker Protection to Social Insurance via Socialism and Agrarian 
Reform 
 
When the Constituent Congress of Swedish Social Democracy met in 1889, workers' 
insurance had become a word but not a fact in Sweden. In 1884 the leftwing liberal 
Adolf Hedin had presented his motion in Parliament about workers' insurance, which led 
to a public investigation by a committee, which published its positive report in 1888.42 A 
few motions formulated as questions - as was the custom of the time - about the 
immediate conditions of the workers had been tabled. The Congress adopted a general 
resolution on "The Question of Protective Legislation/Skyddslagstiftningsfrågan/", 
which seems to be a commented translation of a similar resolution, referred to above, by 
the Constituent Congress of the Austrian Party at Hainfel a good four months earlier. 
Workers' insurance was dismissed, and a set of demands of protective legislation was 
put forward, beginning with the 8-hour day.43 The Fourth Congress, in 1897, decided 
upon a motion to send party leader Branting as a delegate to the conference on worker 
protection in Zürich. It also adopted a programme, modelled after the Erfurt Programme 
of the SPD. It included two points on worker protection and a clause not to be found in 
Germany (where Bismarckian insurance had set a new stage of social conflict):  
 
"Obligation for Society humanely to take care of all its members in cases of illness, 
accident, and at the time of old age.”44 
The Sixth Congress, of 1905, upon a proposal from the Executive, decided to elaborate the 
clause of 1897 just mentioned in a noteworthy manner: "Obligation for Society through an 
executive people's insurance humanely to take care of all its members in the case of 
accident, sickness, disability unemployment, and in old age."45 
This was the year after "working-class insurance" had been adopted by the Second 
International at its Amsterdam Congress, and also the year after the Austrian government, 
upon Social Democratic demand, had presented a bill of social insurance, 
i.e., an extension of the workers' insurances of the 1880's.46 
 
                                                          
42 For an overview, see K. Englund, Arbetarförsäkringsfrågan i svensk 1884-1901, Uppsala, Almquist & 
Wicksell, 1976. 
A motion from Malmö asking what could be done for abandoned mothers without means, 
aroused the only social policy discussion at the congress, which finally transferred the issue 
to the party executive and to the parliamentary fraction for consideration. The women 
intervening were mainly demanding a moral condemnation of the abandoning fathers, 
branding them like scabs.47 
 
The programmatic vision of social security remained one of "protective 
legislation/skyddslagstiftning/", the rubric of the treatment of social issues at the Sixth, 
Seventh and Eighth Congresses. The major discussion at the two last congresses, of 1908 
and 1911, on the topic concerned special protection of women, with regard to nightwork or 
working time, which the women were against. Defeated in 1908, the principle of gender 
equality was explicitly expressed by the Eighth congress, over the skeptical indifference of 
the party and trade union leadership.48 At the congresses of (the fall of) 1914 and 
1917, the topic itself was virtually absent. 
 
In his report to the Copenhagen Congress of the Second International on party activity, 
Branting dealt rather extensively with social legislation, emphasizing that "Sweden i still 
far behind". He mainly dealt with protective legislation and employers' liability for 
accidents. He also mentioned that the SAP had proposed, on the occasion of government 
the health insurance bill, that health insurance should be made compulsory.49 
 
Social insurance was a question pushed, in this period, primarily by leftwing liberals. The 
first Parliament motions about unemployment insurance, in characteristic Swedish 
parliamentary fashion formally demanding an investigation, were tabled by the Liberal 
Edward Wavrinsky in 1908, 1909, and 1910, each time stopped by agrarian conservatives. 
On the other hand, the leader of the Metal workers' union, Ernst Blomberg, by far the most 
far-sighted and consistent reformist of the first generation of Swedish labour leaders, was 
involved in the earliest initiatives.50 The Metal workers' union, Metall, had decided upon an 
unemployment fund in 1895.51 
The LO/TUC/ leadership showed little enthusiasm for demands of unemployment policies 
by the state. At the 1917 LO congress the United Union, which organized various factory 
workers, demanded a "solution soon to the question of state support at the time of 
unemployment". The LO leadership /Landssekretariatet/ declared that alert unions had 
solved the problem by establishing their own unemployment funds. While recognizing that 
there might be areas where state intervention would be called for, the LO leadership 
recommended rejection of the motion referring to an ongoing - in fact latent and expiring - 
public investigation. The Congress finally adopted the motion.52 
 
When the moderately conservative government in 1918 presented a bill of moderate public 
support of voluntary health insurance the Social Democrats were rather passive. The part of 
respected and respectful progressive opposition was played by a group of Liberals, including 
Wavrinsky, and headed by the progressive Gothenburg entrepreneur James Gibson, 
demanding a more comprehensive obligatory insurance. The responsible Minister, Count 
Hugo Hamilton, a socially concerned seigneur, recognized Sweden's social lag, but held that 
in the face of a divided friendly society opinion a more ambitious legislation was 
impossible.53 
 
This picture has to be nuanced. The party journal Tiden, for example, contained more articles 
on social policy than ever before the second half of the 1940's, both covering developments 
abroad - Branting on Austria in 1908, Anton Andersson on Old Age Insurance and on the 
Minority Report on Poor Law Reform in 1909, Fritjof Palme on "People's Insurance in 
France" in 1910 - and domestic issues and investigations. In the Old Age Insurance 
Committee, appointed in December 1907, and whose 1912 report formed the basis of the 
1913 Pensions Act, Branting took an active part. In Parliament he was vice-Chairman, 
under Hamilton of the Special Committee handling the bill in 1913.54 The party also tabled 
a motion to the 1913 Parliament, demanding certain specified adjustments of the 
government pensions bill, some of which were accepted, and also demanding an 
investigation into employers' obligation to contribute to the pensioning of their workers 
(not accepted).55 
  
The new programme of SAP adopted at the 1920 Congress, reaffirmed the classical 
socialist working class perspective. - It is often forgotten that the Bolshevik split off did not 
mean that the main heirs of the Second International became non-Socialist Social 
Democrats in the post-World War II sense. - Socialism was the main solution to poverty, in 
the meantime protective legislation should be fought for. Thirdly, since it was on the public 
agenda anyway, social insurance should be bettered and extended. 
 
Point IX of the new SAP programme dealt with social insurance, under utter brevity: 
"Accident insurance. Health insurance. Maternity insurance. Unemployment insurance. 
Pensioning of old people and invalids as well as child and widow pensioning." A modest 
proposal of putting "obligatory" in front of each was summarily dismissed by Per Albin 
Hansson as  “unnecessary", and duly dismissed by the congress without debate. 
 
Point X dealt with worker protection, thirteen detailed demands. Two led to brief debate 
and to roll-calls. Arvid Thorberg from LO demanded that the legal 8-hour day should be 
called "maximum day", but the proposal of the programme commission of "normal day", 
referring to the situation of non-industrial workers (for whom even a provisional 8-hour day 
was still beyond reach) carried the day. Another vote was taken about the Programme 
Commission's proposal "Freedom to emigrate and to immigrate", which the party executive 
wanted to delete. Again, the commission won the day.56 
 
The question of poverty was dealt with by Gustav Möller - the future architect of Swedish 
social policy - in a speech to points VIII, XII, XIV and XVI of the programme, dealing with 
foreign trade, socialization, cooperation, and taxation. Möller stressed that "an effect of the 
abolition of exploitation must be the abolition of poverty. Care has to be taken not to 
abolish exploitation in such a way that poverty gets bigger than it is now. ... Investigations 
have shown that the workers with the best conditions have reached as big a part of the 
result of common production as an equal distribution of the fruits of production would 
yield. Thence it follows that something else and more is required than the abolition of 
capitalism for the abolition of poverty... What has to be done, above all, is to do away with 
the enormous waste of the productive forces, which takes place in capitalist society." This 
is part of an explicit anti-Bolshevik polemic, but the important point in the context here, 
particularly in view of Möller's later location in Swedish history, is the concrete socialist 
perspective. Right after the previous quotation Möller continued: "It has turned out that the 
enormous boom, which the world war brought to our country, has not brought any rise of 
the working class standard of living, which, on the contrary, is somewhat lower than before 
the war. Everything speaks to the necessity to begin now the work of socializing production 
and abolishing capitalism.”57 This speech is also a part of the history of Swedish 
socialpolitik. 
 
When did it all change? Answer, 1925-26. That is a date little observed by conventional 
historians, the period of the third Social Democratic minority government, little known for 
any historical achievements. A clear amount of time has lapsed both since the first Liberal-
Social Democratic coalition, of 1917, and the "democratic breakthrough", of the late fall of 
1918 - when the imperial thrones were crumbling in Berlin and Vienna. A clear amount of 
time remains before the parliamentary breakthrough of Swedish Social Democracy in 1932-
33, and the replacement of socialist programming with the Realpolitik of crisis 
management. 
"The big obstacle to this reform work /of ours/, overshadowing everything, has been 
militarism", Branting exclaimed in his inaugural speech to the SAP Congress of 1924. 
Second to the reduction of military expenditure was the "so immensely important agrarian 
question, where Social Democracy holds the flag for the poor proletariat, who people our 
crofters' and land labourers´ cottages."58 
 
Branting pointed to the top priority item of the labour movement agenda after the 
achievement of parliamentary democracy disarmament - decided upon in 1925, by Liberals 
and Social Democrats. But his mentioning of the agrarian question should also be taken 
seriously, Sweden was still a preponderantly and agrarian country. Urbanization is invoked as 
one of the explanatory processes of the rise of the welfare state mainly functionalist, non-
historical arguments. But its importance also be tapped by historical investigation. 
 
We may learn of the central significance of agrarian reform not only from the intellectual 
leader of SAP, but also, and more tellingly, from the Swedish trade unions of the first half 
of the 1920's. "The /1922 trade union/ congress exhorts the unemployed to seek their 
outcome to the largest possible extent in agriculture, and requests that the government and 
the proper authorities and particular associations forcefully to support the striving of the 
unemployed to acquire agrarian property /jordbrukslägenheter/".59 A similar, albeit slightly 
less starry-eyed resolution was passed by the LO Congress of 1926.60 
  
Socialism and agrarian reform were thus alternatives to social policy in today's sense of the 
word. And the financial possibilities had to be created by the reduction of the classical 
expenditure of the state, i.e., for purposes of war. 
As party secretary, Möller was in charge of the SAP elect campaigns. For the 1924 election 
he had written a brochure called 'What we want', emphasizing peace and disarmament, and 
secondly reduced tariffs. Other things Social Democrats wanted in 1924 were 
unemployment insurance, the preservation of the 8-hour day, protection of agrarian 
tenants, access to farms by crofters and landless labourers etc.61 
 
As Minister for Social Affairs 1924-26, Möller tried to break with the policy of budget 
cuts and to open room for social expansion. "If we could achieve an ease in public 
finance through the proposal of disarmament, then it is possible that we could, together 
with a reasonable mitigation of taxation, get room for an embetterment of the pensions 
insurance and to take up the questions of health insurance and unemployment 
insurance...62 Möller introduced a set of government bills (1926:113-17) dealing with 
health insurance, to no avail. A bill of unemployment insurance never materialized, 
because the government fell on the issue of principle, whether the Unemployment 
Commission should have the right or not to direct unemployed workers to workplaces in 
partial conflict.63 
 
Möller's 1926 election brochure centers on social insurance, and it carries the telling title 
Unemployment Insurance and Other Social Insurance /Arbetslöshetsförsäkringen jämte 
andra sociala försäkringar/. There a set of demands are put forward, which constitutes a 
novel departure of Social Democratic thought in Sweden. 
 
"To this aim /of giving protection to honest citizens and of providing security on the 
occasion of unprovoked adversities of all kinds/ the Social Democrats demand: 
• a reformed health insurance 
• a reformed  accident insurance 
• a reformed   pensions insurance  
• the introduction of maternity benefits and maternity insurance, 
• the introduction of support to or insurance of widows with minor children, 
• the introduction of insurance against occupational diseases, 
• the introduction of  unemployment insurance. 
 
Only when these demands have been carried through will Sweden be able to claim to be a 
civilized country.”64 
A similar view was expressed by Möller in one of his two election pamphlets in 1928. 
"From a Social Democratic point of view, no task can be more urgent, after the conquest 
of universal suffrage and the introduction of the 8-hour day, than the creation of a social 
insurance system, which gives a real feeling of security and safety to the citizens of the 
land."65 
As it turned out, however, Swedish citizens at that time were more aroused by other 
feelings. The 1928 elections were a clear setback for SAP - although its absolute vote rose 
with a higher turnout - and the main victor was the Right, after an anti-socialist campaign 
of a vehemence thitherto unknown in Sweden.66 And the social policy perspective as well 
as agenda of the Swedish labour movement was to change again too 
 
2.2. Beyond Social Insurance - But Short of Socializing Consumption 
 
The 'People's Home' and 'the Population Question' 
 
The oncoming Depression changed the orientation of Möller´s electoral pamphlets. For the 
elections of 1930 he wrote Swedish Unemployment Policy - Social Democratic and 
Bourgeois, and for the 1932 election the topic was, The Crisis of Capitalism. 
indicated by Möller's subsequent publications, for the elections of 1934 and 1936, The 
Whole People at Work, and Better Pensions, respectively.  
 
In the perspective of Swedish Social Democracy, (un)employment policy was a central part 
of social policy, and its organization sorted under the ministry of Social Affairs, headed by 
Möller after the victorious Social Democratic election of September 1932. In this context, 
however, we will have to leave out a treatment of the Social Democratic crisis policy.67 
One thing is noteworthy, though, neither SAP nor LO launched the idea of an expansion of 
social expenditure with a view to boosting purchasing power in the crisis.68 Unemployment 
insurance was given priority - second to a public works programme - against the objections 
of Finance Minister Wigforss, who regarded the former as irrelevant to the current crisis. 
LO Chairman Forslund, conceded that, but urged nevertheless at the meeting of the Party 
Executive after the 1932 elections that unemployment insurance be given top priority.69 
 
For our purposes here, it is significant to take notice of a radical change in the Social 
Democratic conception of social policy in the course of the 1930's. Let us first register how 
differently Möller looked at it by the time of the Party Congress of 1940, as compared to 
his views at the end of the twenties, mentioned above. 
 
"If I now should give a picture of today's situation, perhaps I ought to, first of all, 
to remind you, that 'social policy' is a common designation of a series of utterly 
varying interventions and legislative measures. ... I think one can divide our social 
policy into ten different branches ... First, we have general workers protection. 
Further the various work time regulations. Number three is a bunch of social 
insurances. Number four maternity support and child care. Number five social 
housing construction, and number six invalidity support, which, true, is linked into 
social insurance but which by its nature is separate from it. Further there are various 
possibilities for education, scholarships, interest-free study loans, unemployment 
schools, vocational schools etc. Then there come measures for a more general 
bettering of the possibilities of support for those who have a hard time in society ... 
 
Finally we have unemployment policy, and a group which will have to be called 
diverse and which consists of single laws and measures which do not fit in under the 
other titles."70 
 
Are-emphasis on worker protection and worktime regulation together with a relative 
demoting of the "bunch /knippe/ of social insurances", is perhaps most striking in a 
comparison with Möller's perspective on the late 1920's. But some of the other items on the 
list indicate, albeit somewhat discretely, a new departure in the 1930's. We shall approach 
it via a détour of imagery and philology. 
The term "welfare state" has never put on much political or cultural weight in Sweden. It 
has more to do with conceptual world of social scientists and historians, popular rights or 
political polemics. This is apparently in contrast to Britain or, say, the Netherlands, where 
the welfare state or the "verzorgingsstaat" is common currency in public debate. That is 
remarkable, primarily in view admittedly somewhat esoteric, interests of political in which 
my distinguished colleague Arnold Heidenheimer is blazing the trail. The welfare state 
became a catchword during the anti-Hitler war, coined by the Anglican Archbishop Temple 
in 1941 and given post hoc incarnation by the Beveridge plan a year later. Before that, the 
term had occasionally been  used in Germany abusively.71 
 
Gustav Möller has a good claim to an early location in the genealogical chain. In above, 
Möller titled the section where he introduced his and the party's idea of a comprehensive 
system of state would not be only a nightwatchman's state but also a welfare state".72 
 
But the term did not stick. The Social Democrats' own designation of their achievements in 
the 1930's was " policy /välfärdspolitik/".73 In the Swedish of the period, it had a 
connotation of a "policy for the common good". In retrospect, the policy and the Social 
Democratic ideology are generally known as folkhemspolitik and folkhemsideologi, the 
policy and the ideology of the "People's Home". To readers with any knowledge of Sweden 
of the 1930's, no footnoting would be necessary to sustain that assertion. Its origin is clear. 
In the Social Democratic sense of it, the word goes back a speech by SAP leader Hansson 
in 1928.74 Neither Hansson himself, nor the party used the word "folkhem" very often in the 
1930's, and a grounded guess is that only from the early war years Hansson, as Prime 
Minster of a country threatened by invasion and occupation, became the father of the 
country.75 -  It is only in non-Swedish that a writer with the slightest concern for a living 
language can talk of Hansson as 'Hansson'. In Swedish, even a writer who, like the present 
one, can claim no particular affinity with the late and great leader of Swedish Social 
Democracy, would either, occasionally use his full name, or more generally, use only his first 
name, Per Albin. No other Swedish politician neither before nor after, has reached such a 
rapport with the people, that the use of his surname only would express a particular 
Verfremdung, ceremoniousness, or hostility. 
 
By 1936, at least, the "People's Home" had nevertheless acquired a certain standing. 
Thus, for instance, Sweden's leading literary critic, Fredrik Böök, a maverick, pro-
German Conservative, opens his traveller's book through Sweden in 1936 by a 
reference to "the Swedish People's Home, which his former Excellency /this was 
during a brief summer government by the Farmers' League/ Hansson, Per Albin,loves 
to speak about".76 
 
The People's Home had an explicit connotation of 'family' - rather than 'house' -, of 
family community and equality with "no favourites or stepchildren". It connoted 
common concern and caring for each other and had its focus on society rather than on 
the State and particular institutions. It is noteworthy, and testifies to the tactical skill 
and success of the SAP, that the notion turned out quite compatible with a 
reaffirmation of classical working class demands in the fields of social policy. 
Paradoxically, the notion's relationship to the most innovative Social Democratic 
policy of the 1930's was more problematic, in spite of an apparent parallelism. 
 
Much more radical and considerably more original than the economic crisis policy and 
the economic theory of the so-called Stockholm School was a proposal of social reform 
put forward in 1934 by Alva och Gunnar Myrdal, Crisis in the Population Question. By 
a remarkable, and politically successful, tour de force, the Myrdals turned the question 
of population decline into a basis of radical social reform - instead of the soil for a 
nationalist and familiaristic breeding policy as in Nazi Germany or in France. In one 
sense the most striking achievement of the Myrdals was that this question was turned 
into a platform of feminist demands - for women's rights to decide over their own 
body, to a job even if married, to societal provisions for children etc. - what was 
generally a bag of arguments for pushing back women into a category of breeders and 
feeders. But here we will have to pass by most of what happened and to return to the 
Social Democratic vision of social policy.77  
 
The radicalism of the Myrdals argued along the lines of the materially precarious 
existence of poor families and the discriminated position of women. But it drew its 
pathos from a technocratic rationalism, akin to Functionalist architecture the Soviet 
Five-Year Plan.78 In the perspective of the Myrdals, social policy became a route and a 
means to social transformation. "The most important task of social policy, its 
immediate aim /syftemål/ is to organize and guide /styra/ national consumption along 
other lines than those which the so-called free consumption choice within the - 
technically often too small - household consumption units otherwise follow under the 
pressure of suggestion and of mass advertising... In the future it will not appear socially 
indifferent what people do with their money: what standard of housing they keep, what 
food and clothing they buy, and, above all, to what extent children's consumption will 
be satisfied. The tendency will anyway run towards a social policy organization and 
control, not only of the distribution of income in society, but also of the orientation of 
consumption within the families. And it is only by strengthening that trend and by 
guiding it in a certain direction, that also the orientations determining the fertility rates 
towards family making and breeding, which determine fertility rates, can be 
changed”.79 
 
The Social Democratic Old Guard kept a certain distance to the ideas of the Myrdals. In 
spite of its general popularity, the "population question" seems never to have been clearly 
linked to the "People's Home" notion, and Möller took a basically opportunistic interest in 
the former. At the 1936 SAP Congress, and in response to a lone neo-Malthusian motion, 
Möller said: "I must say that I don't hesitate for a moment to frighten as many 
Conservatives and as many Farmers' Leaguers and Liberals as possible /helst/ with the 
threat that our people otherwise would die out, if I by that threat could make them vote for 
the social proposals, which I put forward. 
 
That is my simple view of the population question, and that is enough for me.80 In the 
brochure about social legislation in Sweden during the Social Democratic reign, put out by 
the Party Executive in 1938, np special rubric is given to “population policy”.81 
However, this did not mean that the new perspective of guiding and socializing 
consumption had no resonance within Social Democracy. The Social Democratic youth 
organization, SSU, was more receptive than the party to the "population question". For the 
1936 election SSU put out two pamphlets, one of which by G. Myrdal on 'What is the 
Conflict in the Population Question about', and the 1937 SSU programme inserted a 
paragraph on Sex and family clearly inspired by the Myrdals.82 
More important, the new perspective tied in with some central strands of Social 
Democratic policy in the 1930's, most notably housing policy. Here the vision of the 
Myrdals met and got nourished by, both an employment programme and a workers' 
movement's classical concern with the living conditions of the working class, in this case 
particularly those of the agricultural workers.83 
A partly new orientation is also visible in the two leading social politicians of the SAP after 
Möller, the nestor Bernhard Eriksson, a first rank public committee investigator of social 
policy for three decades, from the 1920's to the 1940's, and Tage Erlander, during the war 
Deputy Minister for Social Affairs, and post-war party leader and Prime Minister.  
What is new may be operationalized as an interest in benefits in kind, but as a general 
consumption policy, not as a doling out of food stamps or second-hand clothes to the 
poor. Bernhard Eriksson, in a 1944 overview of social reforms, added to compulsory 
social insurance a combination of benefits in cash and in kind for children, with an 
explicit priority to the latter, geared to housing, food, and clothes subsidies etc.84 
 
Erlander, head of the 1941 Population Investigation, said for his part in 1944: "Still the 
main task of social policy is to make secure the livelihood /försörjning/ of the citizens. 
Several years ahead the point of gravity will have to lay on employment policy, social 
insurance and social care. To the extent that resources allow, however, increased 
attention ought to be devoted to the possibilities of structural transformation /omdaning/, 
which offer themselves if social policy purposefully engages itself in building up 
institutions of different kinds with the task of providing the citizens with utilities free of 
charge or to strongly reduced prices." "The main field of activity for measures of the 
kind hinted at is ... housing policy."85 
 
An interesting, though perhaps only partially representative, expression of this line is 
Alva Myrdal's 1944 critique of the social policy of the ILO, which Myrdal had followed 
very closely. 
 
It is also interesting, because the interwar ILO was not just an inter-governmental effect 
of faded Wilsonian idealism. The ILO at that time was regarded as, more than anything 
else, a Social Democratic achievement. Its director for 1919-1932 was the distinguished 
French Social Democrat Albert Thomas, and the Brussels Congress of the Social 
Democratic Trade Union International declared that the work of the ILO was of "great 
importance".86 Consciously or not, Myrdal attacked the orientations of Continental 
Social Democracy. Myrdal argued along two main lines. First, against the ILO 
concentration on workers' insurance, instead of general social insurance; secondly, and 
more broadly, against the whole idea of centering social policy on social insurance: "The 
whole thought of social policy as a productive social policy - a common investment by 
the nation in its future welfare - with its accentuation /betonande/ of family policy and of 
preventive measures, has been completely neglected by the international discussion 
under the egid of ILO."87 
 
Swedish Social Democracy was not going to surrender completely its vision of 
guiding consumption - and the existing norms of the internal equipment and lay-
out of Swedish housing bear witness to that - but by the end of World War II it 
was clear that the "cash line" had won the day. In Tiden no. 2 1946 Möller 
presented “The Planned Social Reforms”, emphasizing four pillars of a "reformed 
Social legislation”: 
 
"1. People's Pensions 
2. Obligatory Health Insurance 
3. Children's Allowances 
4. The extended /utbyggda public housing policy."88 
 
The crucial issue here, symbolizing victory or, not defeat but, accommodation, was 
children's allowances. The fact that Möller presented them as one of the pillars of postwar 
Social policy meant that the radical Social Democrats had lost. The idea of a children's 
allowance in cash - which represented a major departure from the Myrdal conception of 
guiding consumption - had originally been launched, toward the end of 1942, by the 
Farmers' League intellectual Professor Wahlund, who rapidly got the support of the 
Conservative party leader and social politician Gösta Bagge. Erlander was rather 
negative.89 Postwar Swedish Social Democracy basically accommodated to the "free 
consumer's choice". 
 
However, a lasting and important result of the socialized consumption conception of 
social policy was the postwar ideology and policy that the State had an overriding 
responsibility for standard of the provision of housing and for an at limited costs to the 
tenants.90 
 
2.3. From Subsistence Minimum to Income Maintenance 
 
In this essay the treatment of post-World War II developments will be more summarty 
than earlier history. Nevertheless, while going little into details, the claim is made - and 
then accepted as a valid criterion of criticism - that what is pictured below captures the 
main trend and its turns.  
 
Another matter of principle was decided in the social reforms after the war, the question 
of flatrate minimum standard benefits or differentiated income maintenance. In contrast to 
the cash or kind issue in population policy - where a fundamental settlement was made, 
formally in the form of a compromise91 but, given the background of the controversy, 
meaning above all a stop for further grandiose plans of consumption patterns - only a 
temporary, pyrrhic victory was gained by the flatrate subsistence principle. 
 
The battlefield in this case was health insurance. Health insurance in Sweden was handled 
by friendly societies, which received public subsidies. The benefits paid out were 
differentiated after income, more directly according to premia paid in. In 1944, 
Socialvårdskommitten, the Public Committee investigating and planning most of the 
postwar Social reforms, presented a proposal for compulsory health insurance, covering the 
whole population, and providing income-graded benefits.92 
 
Möller went against it, and carried with him, first the SAP Parliamentary Group, and then 
with the latter Parliament itself. Instead a uniform benefit was adopted, which then could 
be, and was explicitly expected to be, supplemented by voluntary insurance.93 
 
Möller invoked several reasons, pragmatic as well as principled ones. He found the 
committee proposal too administratively complicated, and therefore also implying 
expensive overhead costs.94 But also: "I find it of principle most correct that - when the 
State with its coercive power /tvångsmakt/ and at great cost introduces a general health 
insurance - it shall only see to it that everybody is guaranteed 
a certain minimum standard on the occasion of illness, but that it should be left to the 
individual to take care about what more is needed."95 As Möller pointed out in an article in 
Tiden somewhat later, the increased pensions reform and the health insurance were both 
based on "the principle of subsistence minimum”.96 
 
This was, of course, in line with the Beveridge plan and British Labour Party policy, with 
which Möller made detailed comparisons.97 But what causal role, if any, the Beveridge plan 
had in Sweden is difficult to say. 
 
For financial and other reasons, the putting into effect of the health insurance act was 
postponed. In the new round of plans and preparations, in 1952-53, the subsistence 
principle was dropped in favour of the notion of income maintenance. The Parliamentary 
debate of 1946 had demonstrated little enthusiasm for the flatrate subsistence, the friendly 
societies, for instance, were critical, as were conservative and liberal social politicians. But 
what decided the issue was that, with a committee proposal for reforming the occupational 
accident insurance coming up, the idea concretized of linking the health and occupational 
accident insurances, and the latter was already based on income maintenance principles. 
Möller's successor as Minister for Social Affairs, Gunnar Sträng, seized upon the idea. In 
1952 a committee headed by Deputy Minister Eckerberg proposed the abandonment of the 
subsistence principle, a new government bill was adopted by Parliament in 1953, to take 
effect from January 1st 1955.98 
 
It is interesting, in the light of the following, to notice that this first breakthrough of the 
income maintenance principle had a connection to working class experiences - through the 
link to occupational accidents and diseases in the insurance scheme, and because the 
Minister of Social Affairs, former leader of the Farm Workers' Union, was at the time the 
most direct personal bond between the government and the unions. 
 
The full-scale breakthrough came in 1957-58 with the adoption of the superannuation 
scheme, ATP. About that there is already an extensive literature.99 Here, only two points 
need to be underlined. First, that the income maintenance principle field of pensions was a 
working class and trade union demand, in particular from the better paid Metal workers. 
Secondly, that the demand was explicitly part of a drive for equality, i.e. for equality 
between manual workers and white collar employees - who had supplementary pensions by 
collective agreements. The fight for a superannuation scheme was a struggle for advancing 
the positions of the working class.100 
 
2.4. Beyond Income Maintenance - the Level of Living and the Resurgence 
of Worker Protection 
 
On February 6th 1958 Tage Erlander wrote in his diary: "There are strong reasons to 
consider the great reform period as concluded if we get the pension settled /i hamn/. Then 
there is needed a renewal, which I am not capable of. We will have to tackle the structural 
change of the economy, which the welfare /välståndssamhället/ requires. I remain the 
prisoner of the reformist ways of thought of an old age. The Möller epoch is over. Then his 
disciple Erlander should also disappear from the political arena."101 And what could Social 
policy and the welfare state possibly be more than extensive income maintenance 
programmes, particularly since a transition to socialism was never a concrete perspective 
for Swedish Social Democrats.102 Hugh Heclo tellingly subtitled his excellent comparative 
study of Modern Social Politics in Britain and Sweden, referred to above, "From Poor 
Relief to Income Maintenance". But he also pointed out that no "final answers" had been 
found, and he ended his book, published in 1974, with an epilogue: "The Rediscovery of 
Inequality”. 
 
The inequality and the often very low level of incomes amidst booming welfare capitalism 
became an issue in Sweden in the late 1960's. In 1965 the government, upon parliamentary 
initiative, appointed a Low Income Investigation Committee /låginkomstutredningen The 
SAP Congress of 1968 set up a Study Group on Questions of Equality, jointly with LO and 
headed by Alva Myrdal. "Increased Equality" became a major party slogan. In the 1970 
elections it was put on every electoral poster by the SAP. 
 
The equality programme of the Myrdal group was little specific in its proposals, but 
extensive and radical in range and coverage. Social policy had a rather modest place in 
the document. Most space was devoted to education, secondly to economic and 
workplace democracy.103 But the general egalitarian thrust petered out fairly soon, and 
Social Democracy came on the defensive, with new issues entering the forefront, such as 
environment, nuclear energy, decentralization.104  
 
A remarkable offspring of the Low Income Committee was a set of "level of living" 
studies, pushed by the sociologist Sten Johansson and associates. Though the level of 
living concept is a product of academic sociology wedded to Social Democratic 
reformism, it is important also in this context, looking at the labour movement and the 
welfare state. Because the concept has become an important frame of reference, within 
which the Swedish trade unions view distributive patterns and problems.105 
 
The level of living refers to "the individual's disposal of resources with which he/she can 
pursue his or her own life." "Welfare" denotes the individuals' level of living "in the 
areas which citizens try to affect through common decisions and through commitments 
in institutional forms, i.e., through politics.  
 
Welfare, then, is the individual's disposal of resources in terms of 
 
1. Health and access to care 
2. Employment and working conditions 
3. Economic resources and consumer's protection 
4. Knowledge and possibilities for education 
5. Family and social relations 
6. Housing and neighborhood service  
7. Recreation and culture 
8. Security of life and property 
9. Political resources."106 
 
But the concerns and policies of the Swedish labour movement also took another, more 
specific turn around 1970 beyond the maintenance of existing incomes. In a sense it was a 
return to classical working class concerns, to what was then called arbetarskydd, worker 
protection, now renamed work environment. 
In the recommendations of the report to the 1966 LO Congress, 'The Trade Union 
Movement and Technical Development”, there was still little concern with work 
environment.107 But a couple of years later the strains of the unprecedented economic boom 
began to be noticed in the trade union movement, and a new concern with workplace 
democracy and work environment emerged. Metal Local 1 in Stockholm provided a kind of 
vanguard.108 After an earlier initiative by Metall LO was building up a medical unit, which 
was gathering an impressive empirical material, showing the various physical hardships and 
risks which the LO-members had to put up with in their work.109 In December 1969, LO 
and SAP, as part of the preparing of the 1970 elections, presented a joint programme for 
"Better Work Environment", followed up by a report of the LO executive to the 1971 
Congress110, and, on the government side, by official committees and a series of 
government bills, leading up to the Work Environment Act of 1978.111  
 
2.5. Facing the Economic Crisis: ? 
 
The proper ending of this survey has to be a question mark. The international economic 
crisis is beginning to bite in Sweden too, and what that will mean to social policy, the 
welfare state, and Social Democracy's conception of them is an open question. So far, the 
international debate about "crisis" and "the limits" of the welfare state has had relatively 
little resonance in Sweden. In the electoral campaign of 1982 SAP made four promises of 
welfare state defence: to restore pensions indexation; to restore status quo ante with 
regard to no waiting days in the health insurance; acceptance of the proposal of 
unemployment benefits made by the unemployment insurance funds; and, finally, 
restoration of the level of state support for municipal construction of daycare centers.112 
Those promises have been kept, with the qualification that the existing pensions 
indexation will be modified. And then? 
 
3. Social Democracy and the Formation of the Swedish Welfare State 
 
How much has Social Democracy contributed to the formation of the Swedish welfare 
State? Answering that question is either trivial, a trivial answer to a rhetorical question, 
or something much more difficult and complicated than is usually thought, in Sweden. 
The trivial answer of a modern court chronicler or of the respectful Festschrift 
contributor would be: everything (more or less). 
And in one sense, at least, it would not be untrue. The period of decisive welfare state 
development – whereever one would locate that period in time more precisely - was 
presided over by Social Democratic governments, from 1932 to 1976, having a majority 
or an overwhelmingly dominant plurality in Parliament. The successful policy initiatives 
and decisions were naturally taken by those in office and power.  
 
The matter becomes more complicated, however, as soon as we reformulate the 
question: Would there have been no developed welfare state in Sweden without a 
parliamentary dominant Social Democracy? To the true believer, to utter such a question 
may look like spitting in church. But, of course, only a quick glance South of the Baltic - 
countries amply mapped by the OECD, the ILO, and by the Social statisticians of EC - 
brings the necessary conclusion: Yes, there would have been an advanced welfare State 
even without a dominant Social Democracy, because such a state can be found in the 
Netherlands, in France, West Germany, Belgium. 
Thus, we seem to have a sort of unity of opposites here. The question, what has been the 
contribution of Social Democracy to the development of an advanced welfare State in 
Sweden could be answered with some truth in each utterance: Everything (more or less); 
Nothing (at bottom). This dialectical situation should be a fascinating challenge to 
Marxists. 
Now, a full-scale Marxist analysis would have to include a penetrating study of the 
development of Swedish capitalism, something which our project has not got the 
resources to undertake. And in this essay we will have to confine ourselves to a few 
observations of pertinence. 
 
3.1. Social Democratic Priorities of Ability and Power 
 
Firstly, we will look at how much effort the Swedish Social Democrats have put into social 
policy, what relative priority they have given to it. Here there can be no doubt that the 
social questions have been given top priority. 
 
This priority could be seen as part of a cautious reformist perspective. Opening the 
discussion, in the Party Executive, of postwar party and government policy, Per Albin 
Hansson emphasized: “We must make clear to the public that we do not have such a 
socialization programme as the opponents are asserting. In the foreground of our work for 
the nearest period are the social questions. Later on we will have to occupy ourselves with 
the question on industrial democracy, with school questions etc.”113 
 
However, the most telling indicator of how the SAP has regarded social policy is the 
political rank of its leading social politicians. Here a striking pattern emerges, which 
had best be appreciated against an international background. The difference was 
noticed by the SAP journal Tiden, on the occasion of Aneurin Bevan's resignation from 
the Labour Government, in protest against Finance Minister Gaitskell's inroads into 
free health care. (The conflict had some similarities with one which in Sweden put 
Möller against Finance Minister Sköld and a part of the SAP parliamentary fraction.) 
Bevan had then also come out against the fact that the postwar Labour Governments 
included no Minister of Social Affairs among those of Cabinet rank.114  
 
In other countries the Minister for Social Affairs is often recruited from within or 
around the trade union movement. Such is the tradition of the Dutch and the German 
confessional parties, for example, and of Postwar Austria.115 This should probably be 
interpreted as a concession to certain important sectional interests, particularly in the 
case of the confessional parties, in which other interests tend to have a well-established 
upper hand.116 
 
In Swedish Social Democracy Gustav Möller established a different pattern.117 He was 
party secretary, i.e., head of the party's organizational apparatus - a position he kept for 
long even as a Minister - and one of the three or four top leaders of the party. He was first 
succeeded, in 1951, by a former trade unionist, Gunnar Sträng, by then already six years a 
Minister, however. Sträng was followed by a parliamentary politician of the inner circles 
of the party leadership, John Ericsson, soon replaced by two former party secretaries in a 
row, Torsten Nilsson and Sven Aspling. After the 1982 election the then party secretary 
Sten Andersson entered the government and chose to become, Minister for Social Affairs. 
 
When SAP had to choose its leader and Prime Minister in 1946, after the death of Per 
Albin Hansson, the two main candidates were Möller and his former deputy Minister, 
Erlander, recently made Minister of Education. The choice of Erlander was highly 
significant, as he was then primarily noticed as an investigator and administrator of social 
policy, little known outside the party leadership - Palme made his political career as 
Erlander's personal secretary and trouble-shooter in a number of fields. But in preparation 
for higher office he was given as Ministerial responsibility another sector of the welfare 
state, education. However one would like to assess the achievements, it is clear that SAP 
has contributed to the Swedish welfare state to the best of its ability. 
 
3.2. Slow Growth - The State Constraints of Effort 
 
In quantitative terms, the achievement of the SAP effort is quite modest, when looked at 
in an international mirror. It is only in the 1970's that Sweden, together with the 
Netherlands, has come to occupy front rank in the commitment of the nation's economic 
resources to social security. 
Table 1. Social Security Expenditure As Per Cent of GDP 
 1965 1970 1973 
Austria 17,8 18,8 18,0 
Belgium 16,1 18,1 20,0 
Denmark 12,2 16,6 20,9 
Finland 10,6 13,1 15,0 
France 15,8 15,3 20,8 
Germany 16,6 17,0 18,9 
Italy 14,8 16,3 19,0 
Netherlands 15,7 20,0 22,8 
Norway 10,9 15,5 18,0 
Sweden 13,6 18,8 21,5 
Switzerland 8,1 10,1 12,5 
United Kingdom 11,7 13,8 14,6 
Source: P. Flora et al., State, Economy, and Society in Wester Europe 1915-1975, 
Frankfurt, Campus, 1983 p. 456. 
 
Only by the latter half of the 1960's did the Swedish state, simultaneously with the Dutch 
one, become a welfare state in the sense of devoting more than half of all public 
expenditure to welfare state activities and concerns, i.e., social insurance, social care, 
social assistance, and education.118 
 
Broad international comparisons of this sort have a sensitizing task in view of 
national conceit – or self-flagellation. But their generality also render them 
rather abstract. We should, then add some flesh to the table above. 
 
When Möller in 1947 presented his overview of the postwar social reforms decided upon, 
he made some detailed comparisons with Britain. Both in the case of pensions - because of 
the Swedish regionally varying cost-of-living supplements, once originally imported from 
Denmark - and of health insurance, Möller proudly announced that Swedish benefits were 
higher.119 The nag was, however, that the Swedish health insurance, although the bill was 
passed in 1946, was to take effect only in 1950. In 1948 a further postponement till 1951 
was decided by Parliament, and on April 20 1950 Prime Minister Erlander announced in the 
Second Chamber that the financial situation required that the health insurance - including 
the abolition of the, rather low, in-patient fees at public hospitals - had to be put off again, 
for an indefinite time. At the time of the final passing of the Health Insurance Act, in May 
1953 - with a view to taking effect from 1955 - Social Minister Sträng uttered: "By 
international comparison we have stood rather badly", referring to Belgian, British and 
French postwar health insurance reforms, as well as to several prewar schemes of public 
health insurance, from the era of Bismarck and on.120  
 
The 1953 Health Insurance Act entailed a deterioration in the occupational insurance, now 
partly included into the new health insurance, by the introduction of three waiting days. For 
this and some other reasons the reform was far from a popular success, as its technical 
architect, Deputy Social Minister Per Eckerberg, bitterly complained.121 
 
Another example. The superannuation scheme, ATP, adopted in 1959 is generally regarded 
as the great pride of postwar Swedish Social Democracy in the field of social policy. This is 
the time British Labour was clearly outdistanced, still kept in opposition by the Tories. In 
Swedish postwar politics ATP came to constitute a political watershed, drastically reducing 
the main opposition party, the liberal People's Party and giving a new vigour and self-
confidence to Social Democracy. The bill was passed, with the decisive help of one 
defecting Liberal MP, after one referendum and one extraordinary Second Chamber 
election. 
 
The outcome was, no doubt, a major reform, which gave manual workers a legal right to a 
superannuation equal to that which white collar employees had gained by collective 
bargaining. In international terms, however, the benefits granted by ATP were hardly 
outstandingly unique. Together with the universal basic pension the Swedish ATP system 
was to give from the age of 67 about 60 8 of the previous income of the fifteen best years - 
up to a certain income limit. Two years earlier, in 1957, West Germany, upon Christian 
Democratic initiative - with a very active part played by Adenauer himself - adopted a new 
pensions system, which would provide workers and employees (with a full work career) 
from the age of 65 about 60 8 of the current income of all insured (i.e. economically 
active).122 
 
It seems undeniable that, for all its prioritation and for all its efforts, Swedish Social 
Democracy has not any particularly striking record in its welfare state performance. But 
why? To my knowledge, that question has hardly been seriously tackled so far. Dedicated 
Social Democratic scholars tend to avoid it, proposing instead another topic, such as 
structural forms123 - an important issue, to which we will turn below. 
 
The Social Democratic social policy efforts were fighting against what they themselves 
regarded as strict financial constraints. This was also hammered in by the bourgeois 
Opposition.124 The latter is hardly a far-reaching explanation, however. Why should 
Swedish bourgeois parties be more adamant against increased taxes than their comrades in 
other countries? 
 
The basic reason seems to be the following. In public commitments to social security we 
can distinguish two main roads. One is the legal institution of compulsory social insurance, 
pioneered by Wilhelmine Germany, an institution kept separate from the State proper - the 
territorial government or the Gebietskörperschaften - with its own finance and its own 
administration. The other road, first explored on a large scale 
 
by Denmark (but combined with social insurances), involves that the state apparatus 
proper - central and local - undertakes to finance, organize and administer social benefits 
and social care. In their developed forms, the former might be called a welfare polity, 
the latter a welfare state.125 The leading countries in 1965 are all of the welfare polity 
type, Austria, Germany, Belgium, France, and the Netherlands. Sweden was clearly in 
the second category. The main Swedish institution of social policy before the post-
World War II reforms, the "people's pension" system was administered by the state was 
never financed by contributions to more than half, from 1927 only to a quarter. The rest 
came from taxes and interest on funds.126 
 
Sweden before World War II was a laggard in social security commitments. At the 1932 
SAP Congress, the party's second social policy specialist, Bernhard Eriksson, with a 
mixture of awe and admiration, pointed to the high social security contributions taken out 
in other countries. Whereas a Swedish worker paid 0.5 to 0.8 % of his income to pensions 
insurance (the only one he had to contribute to), a labourer in Copenhagen would pay 7 %, 
a French worker 4 %, and a German one 8.5 % to social insurances.127 To that came 
employers' contributions of about the same per cent of the wage bill. 
 
Since Sweden had been neutral in World War I, her state had neither experienced the 
growth by war mobilization, which, for instance Britain had. Between 1913 and 1918 
Swedish general public expenditure as a per cent of GDP, increased from 10,4 % to14.3, 
in Britain from 12.7 to 48.4.128 
 
Because of previous thrift with the public purse, the SAP reformers had much to catch 
up with, and because the countries welfare state road mainly based on general taxation, 
an expansion was more politically sensitive and met more resistance. The last thing 
mentioned is a hypothesis, but the way the door to expansion was opened seems to 
suggest that it is correct. The solution finally found was twofold, employers' insurance 
contributions and new indirect taxation. The original 1946 Health Insurance Act, which 
was later abandoned, had envisaged no employers' contributions. 79 % was to be paid 
for by the State out of general taxation, of which the direct income tax provided for 
about two thirds129, and the rest by insureds' contributions.130 According to the 1953 
Act, which took effect, only 26% was financed by the state, 51 by contributions from 
the insured, and 26 % by employers' contributions.131 According to Eckerberg, who 
formulated the proposal, the introduction of employers' contributions was crucial for 
breaking out of the financial straitjacket.132 In Parliament, the Conservatives were 
against, because of the increased public expenditure involved. But the Leader of the 
Opposition, Liberal party leader Ohlin, and his party supported the bill, Ohlin 
explicitly hailing with satisfaction the new financial construction, though he would 
have preferred an even greater reduction of the states's contribution.133 
 
The ATP system was to be based on employers' contributions. This meant that 
constraints of public finance did not appear in the heated controversies about it. 
Instead, opposition centered on its character of legal obligation.134 The introduction, in 
1959, of a sales tax met with bourgeois opposition, but was carried with passive 
Communist support.135 
 
The 1960 election was the most polarized in Swedish postwar history, in terms of the 
positions of the main parties. The bourgeois parties demanded, more strongly than 
ever, tax reduction and more room for individualism, while SAP was committed to a 
strong public sector, leaving the defensive posture of 1956. The Social Democrats won 
(modestly) and for two decades even the Conservatives refrained from proposing any 
concrete tax reductions.136 While taxes and social contributions rose rapidly. 
Post World War II Social Democracy has taken Sweden to a front rank of welfare state 
development by the 1970's. That remains an impressive achievement, even though it 
took about fifteen years for it to pick up speed. We have seen already that this rank is 
shared by another country, little dominated by Social Democracy, the Netherlands. But 
perhaps the catch-up is unique? 
 
In quantitative terms, that is not true. In 1930 total social security expenditure in 
Sweden amounted to 3.4 % of GDP, in the Netherlands to 2.1 %.137 The increase till the 
onset of the current crisis, i.e., till 1973, is 20.7 points in the Netherlands and 18.1 in 
Sweden. 
 
3.3. Structural Conflicts and the Impact of Class 
 
“We shall in our propaganda, of course, push forward the pensions, the housing policy, and 
the child allowances. About these reforms there is really no discussion. In this case we 
cannot, unfortunately, count with the same conflicts as we had about the reforms of the 
1930's."138 Thus, SAP party secretary Sven Andersson during the internal deliberations of 
postwar SAP policy, in December 1945. The committees, which formed the basis of the 
government bills were unanimous in their proposals of social expansions, including consent 
from Conservative politicians and representatives of the Employers' Confederation. The 
rapid expansion of the 1960's and early 70 's was also consensual. On top of the improved 
public benefits of various kinds, the employers agreed furthermore to a series of extras in 
collective agreements, collective life insurance from 1963, severance pay /avgångsbidrag/ 
insurance from 1965, special supplementary pension from 1973, and extra occupational 
accident insurance from 1974.139 The SAF, and the organization of small industry and 
handicrafts, SHIO, as well, also took a positive stance, in 1969, to the so-called Seven 
Crowns Reform, by which out-patient fees to private doctors would be reduced to the 
symbolic amount of seven crowns.140 Also the work environment reforms were basically 
consensual, and the Work Environment Act was soon followed up by a more specified LO-
SAF agreement.141 It is also remarkable that the work environment offensive of the 
Swedish labour movement hardly predates a new concern with the same issue by the 
American (Democratic-controlled) Congress, which in 1970 set up the Occupational Safety 
and Health Administration.142 
 
The Swedish case certainly gives some support to the idea that rich and growing societies 
tend to provide more and better social security to its citizens. Whether this is so in capitalist 
societies because it is positively functional to capital accumulation or simply because it is 
compatible with the latter is of little importance here. Whichever the case, the effects on the 
beneficiaries is the same.  
 
In one sense, the strong Swedish Social Democracy was little more than the canal in which 
the high waters of post-World War II advanced capitalism was transported to the land of the 
Swedes. However, to continue the metaphor for a second, it is not unimportant where and 
how a canal is dug. In democratic countries, and even in non-democratic ones with a certain 
amount of legitimacy accorded to popular aspirations, there has always been a fairly broad 
and heterogenous attention to popular distress and misery, for a wide number of reasons. 
There have certainly been moments of history when pitched battles have been fought for or 
against taking any measure, but in the type of societies of which Sweden is a part, 
controversies seem more often to have centered around different assessments of urgency 
and around what kind of measures. 
 
Before World War II the crucial conflicts about unemployment policy did not center around 
whether something or nothing should be done about the situation of the unemployed, but 
what? In the 1920 conflicts centered around how the Unemployment Commission should 
act. On the "conflict directives" two Social Democratic governments found themselves 
forced to resign, in 1923 and in 1926.143 In the crisis policy negotiations of 1933 the 
Progressives /frisinnade/ finally came up with a proposal almost exactly to the same 
amount as the SAP, but with a different wage structure on the public works.144 The 
unemployment insurance passed in 1934 by the SAP and the Progressive was throughout 
the 1930's, till its revision in 1941, received with general skepticism and often outright 
hostility by the unions, because of its restrictive conditions for the recognition of union 
unemployment funds.145 Similarly, the defeats in the 1920's, of various government bills 
proposing extended public support of the voluntary health insurance stranded on 
organizational rocks.146 
 
There is, then, something wrong, or rather biased, with the grandiose project on social 
insurance in Western Europe directed by Peter Flora in its focus on dates of legislation, 
extent of coverage, and costs.147 The causes people fought for or against are largely 
neglected. (This remark should not be interpreted as a dismissal of an oeuvre epochal in 
its quantitative grandeur, to which all scholars of the field have to pay grateful attention.) 
 
In the postwar period, the size of Social policy was hardly a controversial issue, save in 
the 1960 election. On the contrary, it often happened that a bourgeois party, usually the 
liberal People's Party, proposed higher expenditure than the Social Democratic 
government. In the period of 1948 to 1958 this was a constant theme with regard to 
pensions.148 The postwar social policy conflict, about superannuation, was not primarily 
about superannuation and employers' payment of that - upon which there was a broad 
agreement.149 An important part of the SAF was also positive - several major firms had 
workers' pensions already - though it turned out difficult to unite the employers around a 
positive agreement.150 The controversy centered around whether it should be a legal 
obligatorium or not, and, later, how the system should be financially organized. No doubt, 
considerations of parliamentary power were also part of the maneuvering. 
 
The Great Social Democratic Celebration view of the development of the Swedish welfare 
state has to be repudiated and relegated to where it belongs, the lush vegetations outside the 
open veld of scholarship. 
 
On the latter field we should change gear. From asking reform or no reform, expanding or 
containing welfare commitments we should move to raise questions about, what kind of 
reforms and commitments We began this blitz overview with a glance at working class 
strivings and perspectives. Can anything thereof be detected in the current welfare State, 
and can we therein find anything which testifies to the particular significance of a strong 
labour movement? 
 
A. The Principle of Workers' Rights 
 
The Social Democratic governments of the 1920's paid an impressive respect to working 
class principles of right and wrong. In 1926 the SAP government decided to go rather than 
allow the Unemployment Commission to send unemployed workers to the Stripa mines, 
where 12 syndicalist workers had gone on strike. But that was a peak of principled class 
politics. In the 1930's even after having received a sufficient parliamentary base in 1936, 
the SAP government decided to accommodate and circumvent rather than abolish, the hated 
Unemployment Commission and its low wage labour camps.151 This in spite of the act that 
the completely Social Democratically dominated LO Congress of 1936 had demanded that 
the activity of  the Unemployed Commission should be wound up at the soonest”.152 
In the postwar period, no overriding workers' rights were ever asserted by Social 
Democracy, and in the face of rank-and-file working class opposition and leftwing activity, 
the government in 1974 officialty sanctioned employers' legal right to fire workers who 
struck ouside the institutionalized bargaining framework. The practice of the 
corporatistically organized Labour Court also changed in the same period, towards a more 
repressive posture against unofficial strikes. In class where they did not explicitly celebrate 
it, the trade union leaderships refused to voice any objections.153 
It would be biased, however, to give this as the only example. (As well as to neglect it.) On 
the whole, postwar Social Democracy, and particularly from the late 1950's and on, have 
had much of its social policy shaped by the trade unions. This is a striking difference to the 
rather marginal and unimaginative LO position before World War II. Most original was the 
trade union concept of stabilization policy in a full employment economy, which started, 
not from the perspective of the state but from the independence of the trade unions, and 
which put a public labour market policy - fostering mobility and retraining - rather than a 
wage restraint incomes policy into focus.154 - To some extent this was window-dressing, 
hiding the continuous, top secret informal contacts and deals between the Prime Minister 
and the LO leader, of which Erlander discretely gives many examples in his memoirs.155 
But it was more than that. It was also an expression of the fact that LO after World War II 
had the resources to develop policies from its own perspective, and it was also connected 
with the dependence of the SAP government upon LO. Erlander asked in his diary of 
September 22 1949 whether a government Ohlin (Liberal party leader) or Wigforss (Social 
Democratic Finance Minister and First Older Statesman) would succeed him, if LO refused 
to accept his government's stabilization policy.156 At least if one is to believe Erlander 
himself, to take an open fight with the LO leadership was out of the question. 
 
The above-mentioned central social policy conflict in Sweden was pushed by the LO, 
demanding, without delay, a superannuation for manual workers. 
B. Priorities of Tasks: Worker Protection and the Right to Work 
The SAP built its majoritarian political base by its employment policy in the 1930's, and 
whatever the econometrical effects of its policy then, the latter has remained a fundamental 
political capital. Full employment has been a top priority of Swedish postwar Social 
Democracy, expressed in ambiguous labour market policies as well as in electoral 
programmes. Together with Norway and Switzerland, Sweden has been very successful in 
this respect, but only the idealist ideologue would attribute this only to government policy, 
without taking into account the strength of the capitalist economy. However, the centrality 
of labour market policy and the great powers given to the Labour Market Board - organize 
along the lines of Socialist cadre administration, in spite of its corporatist board,157 - is an 
expression of a vindication of classical working class priorities. Via the tentacles of the 
OECD, Swedish labour market policy has also become an export article, a true tribute to 
the imaginativeness of postwar Swedish trade unionist Social Democracy.158 
 
The important part played by worker protection in Social Democratic reform policy, as 
noticed above, both in the 1930's and the 1970's is also a follow-up of early working class 
demands. In the latter period this was not unique per se, as we have seen - and simultaneous 
West German and Austrian concerns could also be cited. However, the degree of priority, 
expressed in both trade union and in public resources allocated, seems to have few 
international rivals, Norway perhaps.159 
 
C. Administrative Control: Self-Management 
Since 1962, and increasingly, the major part of Swedish social security - municipal social 
assistance apart - is handled by a uniform network of public bodies, försäkringskassor, with 
a slightly ambiguous legal status, public authorities without corporatist elements but not 
quite part of the state apparatus proper. These insurance funds administer health insurance, 
pensions, and children allowances. The local boards are appointed by the counties, and a 
minority by two central state agencies.160 Hospital care is in the hands of county 
governments, since 1862. 
 
Originally, the friendly societies organizing health insurance in Sweden had been a motley 
collection. The 1931 act of recognized health insurance funds made all of them territorial 
and non-competitive, with a few accepted exceptions. Thus, the big private concern Asea 
had one, the state Tobacco Monopoly another, and the printers' and the woodworkers' 
unions also had their own funds. There was traditionally a strong progressive liberal 
element in it, from the old Liberal workers' movement, and the Temperance movement. 
The leader of the Progressives in the 1920's and the Prime Minister of the 1931 Act, C.G. 
Ekman, for instance, was an important health insurance treasurer. The "movement" of 
health insurance, as it was called, never had a distinctive class or class-divided character. 
But gradually, some liberal notables apart, it seems to have been pretty much a movement 
run by Social Democratic trade union men.161 
 
The late supplementary social insurances by collective agreement, mentioned above, have 
a bipartite administration. In two important respects, the principle of workers' self-
management is maintained in the current Swedish welfare State, however. Both are clear 
expressions of trade union power. One is unemployment insurance which is still non-
obligatory and is administered by funds of each national union. 
 
Trade union opinion had been divided on the issue. At the LO Congress in 1922 the radical 
minority was against trade union unemployment funds. Unemployment insurance was a 
duty of the state - or of "society", as public power is often called in the Swedish labour 
movement. The unions had to be combat organizations. The majority, however, rallied to 
the demand of a legal insurance based on public contributions to the trade union funds.162 A 
joint SAP-LO conclave in 1930 found views divided about obligatory unemployment 
insurance or not, how it should be organized etc. Finally, it was deemed most tactical 
publicly to demand obligatory unemployment insurance.163 The bill of non-obligatory 
Ghent system, which was presented and passed in 1934, was meant as a temporary 
provisorium.164 
 
A proposal of an obligatory unemployment insurance was put forward in 1948, by the 
classical committee on postwar social reforms, Socialvårdskommitten The majority view 
held that existing trade union unemployment funds would remain, but that everybody had a 
right to unemployment insurance through a new social security agency. The Social 
Democrats, included chairman Bernhard Eriksson, wanted, in a reservation, that the 
existing health insurance funds should be kept, and that they should handle unemployment 
insurance for people non-unionized. The representative of the Conservatives, on the other 
hand, wanted a wholly state administered scheme. All were for obligatory unemployment 
insurance.165 
 
LO gave an ambiguous remiss comment, declaring its adherence to the principle of an 
obligatory unemployment insurance, but finding neither committee alternative acceptable 
for various reasons.166 An obligatory unemployment insurance was taken from the agenda. 
In 1951 Deputy Social Minister Eckerberg wrote in a Festschrift to Erlander: "It is likely 
that we will keep our voluntary unemployment insurance for a long time."167 
 
The second major example is constituted by the funds built up for the superannuation 
scheme, with the most immediate view to maintaining a high level of saving. In the final 
round of negotiations between the Social Democrats and the liberal People's Party, in the 
attempts to find a compromise in the given parliamentary situation, these funds were a 
central bone of contention. Liberal leader Ohlin wanted the funding to be organized by 
private insurance companies, so as to avoid State direction of the capital market. The SAP 
leadership apparently had no such intentions, but were skeptical of Ohlin's proposal for 
various reasons. On the other items of Ohlin's agenda for a compromise, including certain 
possibilities of contracting out, an agreement seemed possible. The idea of workers' 
superannuation was clearly accepted by the Liberals.168 In the end, nothing came out of 
these negotiations, however. 
There would then be large public funds, but who were to run them? The party leadership 
did not regard this a very important issue, and the original proposal was a set of tripartite 
boards. It was the trade union leaders, also SAP MP's, who asserted the right of the unions 
to have a majority of the boards administering "the wage-earners' money". After some 
hesitation the government finally gave in, reducing government representation.169 
 
In the control of the work environment Swedish trade unions also have an important role, 
besides that of the state inspectors and of municipal health authorities. Two structural 
features, in particular, may be underlined. The safety steward is basically a trade union 
representative, not someone with a certain function in the enterprise. This means that local 
unions have the right - upon permission by the state inspectorate - to appoint "regional 
safety stewards", for a number of small enterprises and for new workplaces which have no 
employees yet. These regional stewards need not to be employed by any of the enterprises, 
in which they have the right to intervene. Secondly, safety stewards have the right to order 
all work to be stopped, if they consider immediate danger to bodily harm exists.170 The 
French "Auroux Laws", passed in 1982 by the French Left government do not give such 
rights,171 which Swedish unions got in 1974. 
 
D. Coverage and Form of Organization: Wide and Uniform 
The mean and meagre pension system adopted in Sweden in 1913 bequeathed one very 
important structural legacy to later generations of social reforms: It was universal in its 
coverage. That was a bit of an accident. Neither the committee proposal nor the government 
bill included universal coverage.172 Nor did the SAP motion on the subject.173 But what was 
hardly an accident, but rather an expression of the class relations in Sweden at that time, 
was the principle of a wide coverage. The committee and the government had suggested 
that persons with wealth 'above a certain level should be excluded, and the Social 
Democrats with an income above 2,000 crowns a year, which then corresponded to about 
150 8 of the average wage of an industrial worker.174 
 
The principle of a wide coverage of public social security commitments goes back to 1884. 
Then the urban left liberal Adolf Hedin tabled a motion asking for a public investigation 
into workers' insurance. The motion was clearly inspired by Bismarck's example. But 
before it was taken, the second Chamber made an addition to it, upon the proposal of six 
farmers of the majoritarian Yeoman Party. The addition was "/workers/ and with them 
comparable small farmers and artisans".175 In the ensuing committee the progressive 
farmers' leader A.P. Danielsson followed this up. 
 
Sweden was in many ways a poor and undeveloped country in late 19th century. But in one 
sense it was a much more popular state than those south of the Baltic. Sweden had a strong 
propertied peasantry with their own political leaders and representatives. The undeveloped 
character of capitalism and bourgeois politics also meant that the main line of class conflict 
was drawn between farmers and gentlemen /herrar/.176 
 
Among its many detailed investigations, the Workers' Insurance Committee even made a 
remarkable class analysis of Sweden. Thereby it found that only 6 % (5.5) of the population 
could not be counted among "workers and with them comparable persons". Excluded were 
tradesmen, employees, officials, landowners, and businessmen.177 
 
The Social Democratic reformers of the 1940's continued the line of wide but non-universal 
coverage. It was the bourgeois parties, in particular the Conservatives, who then stood for 
universalism. In the committee proposing a new pensions system, a universal flatrate 
pension was proposed by the two Conservative members, whereas the Social Democratic 
majority wanted a means-tested scheme. Möller was vacillating, but came finally down on 
the side of universalism. Prime Minister Hansson argued, in the 'SAP parliamentary group, 
for means-tested pensions on principled grounds, supported by Erlander and Finance 
Minister Wigforss, the latter for budgetary reasons. But the MPs rebelled and took the 
universal scheme.178 
 
Tactical considerations, with regard to an otherwise rather awkward situation for a party, 
which proudly regarded itself as the reform party, probably played a good part in the 
rebellion. Erlander told the Party Executive in December 1945 that his committee was 
going to propose free meals for all school children. "Those whom it will be most difficult to 
persuade /about this/ are our own people. It is, as a matter of fact, not popular to drop the 
principle of means test."179 
 
 This may sound like the world turned upside down to Anglo-Saxon ears. But wide non-
universal coverage is, as was noted above, an old working class principle. The differences 
to Anglo-Saxon experience follows from where the line of means test is drawn. In Sweden, 
and in Denmark, that line was always drawn high up, excluding only the wealthy minority. 
And since the systems were tax-financed, it was not unnatural for the wealthy and their 
representatives to say, more or less: if we are going to pay for it, we want some benefits 
too. The Swedish Employers' Confederation, SAF, supported the more generous universal 
pensions proposal in 1945-46.180 And in the interwar ILO the Danish employers' 
representative Örsted argued for a universal pensions insurance, to deaf ears.181 On the 
other hand, the wide coverage principle and the one of organizational uniformity precludes 
different schemes for workers and for the broad mass of white collar employees. That was a 
controversy in 1953 between SAP and the People's Party with regard to the health 
insurance. The latter wanted the right to contract out for groups which had their health 
insurance organized by private insurance, such as bank and insurance employees. The 
former won the day, but the government bill also included a special subsidy for voluntary 
extra insurance, mainly aimed at farmers and small entrepreneurs. Obligatory universal 
health insurance still kept certain non-universalistic elements.182 
 
The superannuation Act did give the possibility for collective contracting out, a tactical 
concession to an uncertain white collar opinion. Here other factors contributed to making 
Swedish social security what it looks today. After investigations and negotiations, both 
SAF and the white collar unions found it practically impossible to arrange a pensions 
system outside ATP. The SAP was lucky too. In replacement for earlier collective 
agreement pensions, the SAF conceded in 1960 to a generous salary increase, of 15 % on 
the average.183 The dire warnings of the wage and salary consequences of the Social 
Democratic pensions proposal were manifestly proved wrong, and SAP made a lasting 
inroad among the middle strata. 
 
As was mentioned earlier, since 1962 a General Insurance Act has given a uniform 
organization to Swedish income maintenance schemes, trade union administered 
unemployment insurance being the major exception. However, as we also took notice of in 
the context of unemployment insurance, such a uniformity was long resisted by leading 
social politicians of the SAP; still in 1948. One of the few Communist social policy 
proposals, to which leading Social Democrats ever paid any attention, was a motion of 
1946 about a uniform administration of all social security. But in the end it was not 
accepted.184 
 
E. Finance: Redistribution and Free Public Services 
 
The strict insurance principle of equivalence between payments in and benefits out never 
got firmly anchored in Swedish social security. True, the 1913 pensions system was meant 
to have no redistributive effects185, but soon municipal supplements could be added, 
without having any poor relief character and ditto effects. (That was the Danish pension 
system since 1891.) In 1935 the insurance part was reduced - but not completely replaced 
by taxation as the Social Democrats had originally demanded - and the funding was 
discontinued. This change was passed almost unanimously, and the system lost its official 
name of “pensions insurance”, to become just "people's pensioning".186 
 
However, insurance was not being phased out, neither in principle nor in practice. Bernhard 
Eriksson, the important Social Democratic wartime social planner - chairman of the crucial 
Socialvårdskommitten wrote in 1944 a glowing defence of the insurance principle, for 
"psychological" reasons. "In a social insurance system even the poor will feel satisfaction 
in having himself contributed to the costs of his future security and in having, in the way 
society requires it, done his self-support duty."187 Above we have already taken notice of 
the fact that the breakthrough, in the 1950's, of large-scale income maintenance 
programmes was characterized by an increase of the insurance element. But also, in the 
case of health insurance, that the bourgeois opposition had demanded a higher rate of 
insurance contributions. 
 
Even after the turn of the 1950's, Sweden has been second among Western European 
countries in financing social security out of general taxation, after outstanding Denmark.188 
"Population policy" was a major aspect of Swedish social policy in the 1930's and 1940's. 
But the French and Belgian system of a family wage insurance was rejected outright, 
mainly for egalitarian reasons. 
 
In a comment on family wage and children's allowance system, Erlander wrote in 1944: 
"one should strive for a vertical transfer of incomes in society", noting that the French and 
the (Nazi) German systems only equalized families with children with those without within 
the same "income class".189 Conservative Party leader Bagge had the opposite concern, 
looking for a possibility of equalization within classes without transfers from one Social 
group to another.190 The notion touched upon earlier of wide coverage plus a meals test 
rather high up had, of course, also a redistributive intention and effect. 
 
As a provider of public welfare services - including public education - Sweden is 
outstanding among the OECD countries for which data are available. In 1980 government 
final consumption for welfare services amounted to 17.8 % of GDP in Sweden, as 
compared to 11.6 in West Germany (in 1979) and Finland 11.2, occupying second and third 
rank, respectively.191 The reasons for that top position are many and complex, and the 
configuration of the explanatory factors cannot be laid out here, only some of its 
components. Directly, Social Democracy has contributed an idea of socially planned and 
provided consumption, first laid out by the Myrdals, later modified and the only spoken 
silently about, but nevertheless with some significance. Erlander stated in 1944: "It is ... not 
indifferent how the increased income /of families with children/ is used ... it may be in the 
interest of the families and of society to try to educate /upplysa/ and guide the families to 
use their income in a particular way."192 He then went on to point to maternity clinics, 
meals for school children, daycare centers, the public production of subsidized children's 
clothes and shoes, etc. The two last ideas never materialized, but the others did, though it 
was going to take decades for Erlander's, for that time quite advanced appreciation of 
daycare facilities to free women from being bound to the home, to gather political force. 
 
Probably much more came from Social Democracy only indirectly, through Social 
Democratic mutations of structures handed down from ancient history. Local territorial 
governments - as opposed to transfer funds - are of old very strong in Sweden, an effect of 
ancient peasant independence. It is noteworthy that the administration of the pensions 
system of 1913 was not given to any corporatist organ nor to any agency of the central state 
apparatus. Its basic unit of administration were municipal pensions committees.193 Hospital 
care had since 1862 been put under the responsibility of elected county councils. 
 
In a profound sense, modern Swedish Social Democracy is the legitimate heir of the old 
propertied Swedish peasantry: cautious, moderate, steadfast, honest, and popular. (Of 
course, this does not necessarily pertain to the sleek academic administrators with their 
party card as a letter of recommendation, but to Social Democracy as a broad 20th 
century social movement.) 
 
Another legacy which could be, and was, turned to advantage was urban and professional 
underdevelopment. For instance, a development of "socialized medicine" had a relatively 
well-located baseline, if it could start from a situation of Sweden in 1940: of 3436 
legitimate physicians in the whole country, 620 were public county /provinsialläkare/ or 
city doctors, 170 were employed by the armed forces, 979 by physical hospitals (almost 
all public), and 160 by mental hospitals (most of them public).194 That is, at most 44 % 
were private practitioners only. But it is also true that Möller was lucky, after a couple of 
other probings, to find a radical and colourful figure to organize a progressive health care 
policy, Axel Höjer, head of the Medical Board 1935-1952, and the latter did not escape 
vicious resistance.195 
 
Finally, there are some special structural continuities, across profound changes - 
continuities of which we cannot yet say whether they are just a striking coincidence or 
whether there are some never-outspoken undercurrents of influence. The most important 
such link is between the pre-World War II Unemployment Commission and the postwar 
Labour Market Board. The first was the institution of the realm most hated by the 
working class, the latter the pride of the trade union economists. The former was, in the 
20's, a bastion of deflationary gold currency orthodoxy and a center of bourgeois policy-
making196, the latter the center of imaginative Social Democratic economic policy, the so-
called Rehn-Meidner model, tellingly named after two leading postwar trade union 
economists. In spite of all differences, both have in common, a hostility to cash payments, 
a commitment to public works programmes, to vocational training, and to encouraging 
labour mobility.197 The opposite class appreciations of the two authorities hinges on the 
difference between one geared to a pre-Keynesian low-wage economy, the other to an 
expensive and mobile high-wage economy. 
 
With its camps of rural colonization, using as little cash as possible, and its stern work 
ethic, the Unemployment Commission was very much an epitaph of kulak social policy. 
 
That Sweden became a welfare state is neither the merit nor the fault of Swedish Social 
Democracy. Even if the SAP had been defeated, in 1932, in 1948 or in 1956-60, some sort 
of welfare state is most likely to have emerged anyway. But the kind of welfare state 
Sweden became is to a large extent an outcome of Social Democratic policies. There are 
parts of these policies, which seem to have been shaped long ago, when the Swedish state 
was cast in its mould, but there are others and more, which tap their roots from other 
sources. Swedish Social Democracy claims to be the labour movement of the country. 
Without agreeing to any allocation of patent rights in this field, it seems clear that the 
welfare state, which the Swedes have got through the strivings of Social Democracy, 
corresponds to a large extent to the classical demands of the labour movement within 
capitalism. But that welfare state is also the legitimate heir of a propertied peasant society 
superficially governed by a crust of officials and landowners. Post-World War II Swedish 
Social Democracy has drawn upon both the labour movement and the structural heritage 
bequeathed to it, when the propertied farmers had to give in to other classes. International 
and domestic class history, both unite in the edifice, which we now see in front of us. 
 
Class relations, state structures, and the meanderings of politics give us the picture we see. 
Social Democracy is not just deus ex machina, but nor is it a function of capital. It is a 
historical movement of a working class character. 
 
To what extent its welfare policy has affected the capitalism, which the classical labour 
movement set out to abolish, and to what extent the same policy has in fact made people 
equal. secure, and happy are other stories.  Perhaps we will find some or the other on 
another occasion. 
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